Pollard Is Now a Hostage

The April 2 NY Times lead story reports the breakdown of attempts to extend negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. One sentence in the article should make the stomach of every American turn. The article reports that President Obama authorized John Kerry to discuss the possible early release of convicted spy Jonathan Pollard. Then comes the following apparently innocuous sentence: “Whether, and how, to use Mr. Pollard has been vigorously debated within the administration.”

 

Our government is debating how best to “use” the possible release of a prisoner, not a POW and not a quasi-POW enemy spy captured in the Spy vs Spy world of the Cold War. Pollard is an American citizen convicted of espionage on behalf of a friendly country and sentenced to life imprisonment after pleading guilty under a plea bargain gone bad. Many prominent Americans and more recently, Israelis, have pleaded unsuccessfully for leniency. Regardless of what you may think about the merits of that question, it is abhorrent to see indications that our government regards the decision to hold or release him as a means to the end of inducing our friends in Israel to do what we want them to do.

 

And what do we want them to do? According to The Times, “some officials argue that [Pollard] should be used only to break the logjam on final-status issues – the borders of a new Palestinian state, for example . . . . Mr. Kerry has argued that Mr. Pollard could be more useful now in keeping the talks alive, given the possibility of parole [in 2015] . . . .” Apparently our Secretary of State understands that Pollard’s value will diminish as a parole hearing approaches.

 

Regardless of whether you thought Pollard should be released, most of us were under the impression that in either case the view was based on principles of policy and justice. Now it appears that our government had an additional reason to hold onto Pollard that was based not on policy but on utility. What can we trade him for? This is the sort of thing that thug regimes do, and certainly criminal enterprises do, but not something our government does. As Ruth Marcus wrote in The Washington Post on April 1, “there is something disconcerting – repulsive is only slightly too strong a word – about having justice used as a diplomatic bargaining chip.”

 

And what are the competing “uses” being debated for Jonathan Pollard’s freedom? John Kerry wanted to offer him to the Israelis so that they would release more cold-blooded murderers, itself the price demanded by Mahmoud Abbas to sit with folded arms for another nine months. And if the Israelis went along with this, as they were reportedly inclined to do, it would be a dirty business for them and the Americans, but there would (other than the absence of a concession from Abbas himself) be at least some perverse symmetry in the deal.

 

What is more bewildering, however, is that some of our unnamed officials were counseling the President to hold onto Pollard and throw him into a final status deal. Indeed, it seems to be the dominant view among critics of this deal – including Senator Dianne Feinstein – that Pollard should be saved to be hauled out to get the really big concessions we want from the Israelis down the road. Which issue do these officials think the Israelis would concede in exchange for Pollard’s freedom: Security in the Jordan valley? Palestinians’ right of return? End of hostilities? Jerusalem?

 

We have seen in the Gilad Shalit deal that the Israelis will free hundreds of terrorist murderers from prison to win back one Jew from captivity. We have seen them agree nine months ago to free scores more to win the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. Somehow, time and again, the world views Israel as greedily and stubbornly holding all the high cards, and believes that what’s needed is the right pressures, the right inducements, to persuade Israel to give them up. Keeping Pollard as a trump card for the US is, in this respect, incompetent and amazingly ignorant of Israeli motivations in its negotiations with the Palestinians. Unfortunately, we’ve become used to such incompetence. What is new, and more saddening, about this latest action is that it shames America as well.

A few simple questions about Obama Administration foreign policy "process"

Just a few simple questions come to mind as we watch our President flounder in his effort to figure out how to respond to Assad’s recent use of chemical weapons to massacre his fellow Syrian countrymen (and women and children): • Why is the Obama Administration only now scrambling to rally international support for a military response? • Why is the Administration only now scrambling to rally Congressional support for a military response? • Why is the Administration only now scrambling to develop a legal rationale for a military response? • Before declaring that Assad must go, and later on, that the use or movement of chemical or biological weapons would be a “game changer,” did President Obama follow his much-admired consultative and deliberative method of decision making, and thus, have in mind what sorts of actions the US might take if this red line were crossed? The present circumstances – Assad’s use of chemical weapons – were not inevitable, but surely, reasonably anticipated. Ideological issues aside, the incompetence of the President in foreign policy, as exemplified by the current predicament, should jump to the top of anyone’s list of reasons why he his presidency has diminished our nation. PS – Difficult to know, but is it possible that the British Parliament might have voted differently if Obama had invested more in his relationship with the UK? Indeed, is it possible that a few MP’s had in mind the return of the Winston Churchill bust when they cast their vote not to support President Obama in Syria? PPS (more important) – As others have pointed out, what is Iran to conclude about the possibility of US military action to remove its nuclear weapons capability? Isn’t it abundantly clear now that, even if at some point Obama reluctantly concluded that the time had come to take such action, he would find himself even more hamstrung than he is today?

How the US Can Avoid an Israeli Strike on Iran

There has been a lot of jawboning by US military and Administration officials, both in public and, presumably, in private talks with Israeli leaders, to dissuade them from launching a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. In fact, there is probably only one approach that the US can take to avoid an Israeli attack, and that is to credibly assure the Israelis that the Americans will do the job before it's too late.

There have been several good articles, including one in today's NY Times, outlining the enormous challenges to Israel in accomplishing a reasonably successful raid, and many more articles have emphasized the variously described unpleasant consequences of even successful Israeli military action. True enough, but unless someone has been able to convince the Israelis that they can live with a nuclear armed Iran, then these are the essential pieces of the equation:

1. Israel and the US agree that Iran is aggressively pursuing the development of nuclear weaponry.

2. Israel believes that some time well before the end of this year Iran will have entered what Defense Minster Barak refers to as the "zone of immunity," where it will have dispersed, hidden and buried its nuclear facilites to the point where Israel will no longer be able (even if all goes well) to set the program back significantly.

3. The US faces a similar zone of immunity problem, but due to its greatly superior capabilities, that moment will come months later than for Israel.

4. Sanctions against Iran are finally inflicting pain, but few analysts expect that they will result in either a change in Ayatollah Khamanei's determination to become a nuclear power, or an overthrow of the current regime, during the current year (or more particularly, before Iran enters the zone of immunity).

5. Finally, for Israel the prospect of the current Iranian regime possessing nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable, which for Israel means that it will do whatever is in its power to prevent it, including a military strike.

So what is Israel to do? And what arguments are available to its close and powerful friend, the United States, to prevent or at least delay such action? Unless Ayatollah Khamanei does actually (pardon the exprssion) see the light and strike a credible deal very soon, then the only truly relevant message the US can deliver is this: "We are equally committed to preventing Iran from reaching its nuclear objective; we do have the luxury of waiting longer for sanctions to work; but we will use the military option before the window closes on our zone of immunity with Iran."

How can such an assurance be conveyed? Presumably, nothing short of a direct, categorical statement from President Obama to Prime Minister Netanyahu when they meet in Washington in early March.

Some Takeaways from The Washington Institute's Soref Symposium

My wife and I recently came back from two days of presentations at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's (TWI) annual Soref Symposium. Below is an extremely abbreviated summary of some of what I took away from the program. While many of the presentations were explicitly off the record, I am confident that I am not betraying confidences, inasmuch as (a) I am not attributing views to any particular individuals, and (b) the reporting is highly filtered. Despite some intrusion from my own biases, I think I'm conveying some key points gleaned from scholars and policy makers far more knowledgeable than I. See below for list of speakers.

Israel and the Peace Process
Hamas-Fatah deal wouldn't have happened without Egypt, and challenges in Syria, which has historically been a key Hamas sponsor. Mahmoud Abbas has given up on US, more uncomfortable after seeing our abandonment of Mubarak, who had been a key patron. Abbas sees his legacy more in terms of Palestinian unity and "statehood," without peacemaking. Neither Fatah nor Hamas wants to see things change on the ground, however; little will change in the near term. More hopeful about Salam Fayyad staying on as Prime Minister of PA, despite initial indications to the contrary, and fact that Hamas says no. Fayyad is key to credibility with US, Europeans; Fayyad may now finally be looking to run to succeed Mahmoud Abbas. US law requires President to certify that Quartet conditions met before economic aid or dealing with PA government.

US is the only member of Quartet insisting on post-reconciliation government adhering to Quartet conditions. Netanyahu is in Europe this week, essential that he be able to convince Europeans on this point, as well as on opposing UN GA recognition of Palestinian state.

Regarding the "peace process," little chance that Netanyahu will announce bold initiatives in Washington next week. With much higher risks on Egyptian, Gaza and potentially Jordanian borders, and demonstrable lack of sustainability of Arab regimes, it's not a great time for bold, risky moves. Nevertheless, negotiations could possibly get into gear if Netanyahu and Abbas each take a big step and cross a threshold - for Netanyahu, some statements about borders, and for Abbas, acceptance of legitimacy of a Jewish state. Another alternative may be for Obama to put some ideas out there with tacit acquiescence from Israelis, albeit not binding on them, with disclaimer that ideas not applicable to PA that includes irredentist Hamas.

Egypt
From US and Israel standpoint, near term will not be good, question is how bad. Longer term, more likely better than under Mubarak regime. Egypt will not abrogate treaty with Israel - very much in Egypt's interest. Not doing 180 degree turn, but question of whether more than 90. The best of likely near term outcomes is Islamists holding significant minority of Parliament seats and Amr Moussa president (not good, but worse would be majority Islamist). High expectations among young people can give way to problems if too deeply disappointed.

Hopes of those leading the Tahrir Square uprising are giving way to fears. Fears include military continuing Mubarak approaches; too quick march to elections before liberal institutions can develop; increased power of Salafis (worse than Muslim Brotherhood). Women's rights suffering. Others in Egypt say average Egyptian is focused on stability and fears a theocracy. Muslim Brothers will gain seats in Parliament, but Salafis don't believe in voting, unlikely to seek political power. (Note that recent reports indicate the Brothers may now be seeking majority in Parliament, possibly presidency).

Iran
Will Arab spring sweep eastward into Iran? From standpoint of Iran's principal troublemaking role in region - including Hamas, Hezbollah, nuclear weapons proliferation - regime change is critical. Arab spring has derailed US Iran policy. US Administration has no new ideas, content to kick this can down the road to second term. We need to slow down the nuclear clock and speed up the democracy clock in Iran

Syria
Newspapers have been reporting that Israel is wary of what could happen if Assad were pushed out of office, the devil they know being better than one they don't. Not everyone feels that way: some astute Israelis don't see the unknown being any worse than Assad. Note that Syria is a fairly secular country; the Muslim Brotherhood not a significant presence. In this case, the moral force favoring the uprising is in line with strategic interests.

Turkey
A year or so ago, perspective on next year's elections was that it could be the last election before the country becomes irredeemably Islamist and anti-Western, the key being whether AKP locks in another term for Erdogan. Now the issue is framed as to whether AKP only gets a majority, or gets a 2/3 majority enabling it to amend the Constitution to lock in powers in the manner of Venezuela. Beyond that, there are still some optimists who think that in the medium term Turkey under AKP will find its natural interests being in strong competition with Iran, not aligned with it, even eventually [re]-aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Economic Aid
Egypt and Tunisia desperately need significant amounts of economic aid to get through critical transitional period. On a "micro" level, the people need stability and there is no margin for deterioration of average citizen's economic condition. Jordan as well is in dire need of such help for the monarchy to survive. Help must come from Saudis, not Americans. Saudi Arabia may condition economic assistance to Egypt on no prosecution of Mubarak.

US Strategic Interests
Excellent outline of principal US strategic interest in the Mideast (PS - did not come from National Security Adviser Tom Donilon):
1. Global access to energy and freedom of shipping lanes.
2. Secure and strong Israel
3. Enduring interest in and commitment to defeating and dismantling terrorism.
4. Nonproliferation. Here, greatest threat is tactical nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
The above must be paramount for US. Bahrain is situation where our vital security interests trumped pro-democratic sympathies.
Four strategic pillars in the region are Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. One speaker described the competing powers in the region as ominously similar to Europe in 1911.

Islamic Extremism in the US
Heard from heads of three US Islamic groups working to combat extremist Islamic ideology in US. All agreed that US Islamic establishment was funded and populated by Gulf states in 1970s, strongly infused with Wahabi-Salafist ideology. They dominate mosques and campus Islamic groups in this country. Fighting against violence alone will not be sufficient.

The following is a list of speakers at the Soref Symposium (excluding speakers at breakout sessions I did not attend): Robert Satloff, Exec. Director of TWI; Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli defense intelligence; Soner Cagaptay, director of Turkish Research Program of TWI; Retired IDF Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog; David Makovsky, director of TWI's project on Middle East peace process; Michael Singh, Managing Director of TWI; Scott Carpenter, director of TWI's Project Fikra; Zainab al-Suwaij, executive director, American Islamic Congress; Zuhdi Jasser, chairman, American Islamic Forum for Democracy; Hedieh Mirahmadi, president, World Organization for Resource Development & Education; Matthew Levitt, director of TWI's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; Patrick Clawson, director of TWI's Iran Security Initiative; Mehdi Klalaji, TWI Iranian scholar; Thomas Donilon, assistant to the President for national security affairs; Amr al-Azm, associate professor, Shawnee State University; Dalia Ziada, director, North Africa bureau, American Islamic Congress; Hisham Kassem, independent Egyptian publisher and journalist; Amb. James Larocco, director of Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies; Martin Kramer, TWI Wexler-Fromer fellow; Robert Kagan, Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution; Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson Center.

NY Times Blames the Victims in Reporting of Hamas Murder

A news story in today's NY Times carries the straightforward headline "Killing of 4 Israeli Settlers on Eve of Peace Talks Rattles Leaders on Both Sides." The first paragraph of the story by Isabel Kershner and Mark Landler reads as follows:

"The killing of four Israeli settlers, including a pregnanat woman, in the West Bank on Tuesday evening rattled Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the eve of peace talks in Washington and underscored the disruptive role that ___ could play in the already fragile negotiations."

Now fill in the blank, bearing in mind that the next paragraph reveals that "[t]he military wing of Hamas, the Islamic group, claimed responsibility for the attack . . . ." You might have thought that the writers would be referring to the disruptive role that Hamas intends to play in the negotiations. But that, apparently, is too simple-minded. In fact, the reporters - or rather, editorialists - find that this murder "underscored the disruptive role that the issue of Jewish settlements could play" in the negotiations. Thanks for setting us straight on that. Good thing we have Ms. Kershner and Mr. Landler to clarify that the massacre of four people and an unborn child in a car indicates the disruptive role that the victims, rather than their murderers, could play in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

By the way, are these reporters on the ground so clueless as to think that Hamas is driven to clear-conscience killing of Israelis by "the settlements"?

Parenthetically, I note a somewhat disappointing condemnation of this killing by Salam Fayyad, the PA prime minister who represents the best hope of both Palestinians and Israelis for a viable Palestinian state. He said, "We condemn this operation, which contradicts Palestinian interests and the efforts of the Palestinian leadership to garner international support for the national rights of our people." What struck me most was his use of the word "operation," and the absence of any but a tactical criticism of the actions of Hamas. I do not know Mr. Fayyad, but I'll guess that this statement reflects the realities of Palestinian politics, where a moral condemnation of the murder of Israelis is unacceptable, and the necessary posture is that all agree on the ends and only disagree about the means.

But back to Ms. Kershner and Mr. Landler. I'm not someone who rants about the NY Times and its anti-Israel bias. I'd say its point of view is more of a reflection than a leader of shallow group-think on a number of issues, and this putative news story is perhaps a reminder that reporters ought to stick to reporting facts and leave the interpreting to the Op-Ed page. Funny, the people that come up with the headlines for articles are sometimes blamed for their choice of pithy phrases that may belie the contents of the article. In this case, I think the headline people displayed more straight sense than the reporters.

The article that purportedly reports Hamas's killing of four Israelis in a car begins with the bizarre sentence discussed above, and ends with the following:

"The stop-and-go Israeli-Palestinian peace process has often taken place in the shadow of bloody attacks. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel prime minister who led the Oslo peace process in the early and mid-1990s, said his philosophy was "to fight terror as if there were no negotiations and conduct the negotiations as if there was no terror." Mr. Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli right-wing extremist in 1995."

So in case you got distracted by some of the facts of the case - i.e., Hamas murdered four Israelis - and forgot the point made in the first paragraph, and especially if you thought you had figured out who the bad guys were, the smug reporters remind us that it's right-wing Israeli nuts who are the root of the problem.

Visitation Rights in a Land for Peace Deal

Are the Jews too late to stake their historical and religious claim to the land of Israel?  True, many of the locations in which biblical events took place are in the west bank areas likely to be eventually part of a Palestinian state, while the coastal areas that are within the pre-1967 State of Israel were historically less significant to the Jews.  That aside, has Israel been too passive for too long while the Arab world has asserted its religious dominance over the Jewish homeland?

Two days ago the Israeli government announced plans to include the Ma'arat Hamachpela (Cave of the Patriarchs) in Hebron and Rachel's Tomb in Ramallah on a list of Israeli national heritage sites.  This has had a predictably provocative effect on Palestinian Arabs, including Palestinian Authority president Mahmound Abbas, who see this as an assertion of a long term legal claim to these areas.  I don't think that the Netanyahu government is literally signaling an intention to annex Hebron or Ramallah, but is seeking to establish a reciprocal principle of respect that the Moslems have never begun to accept.

Hearing calls from Hamas and others for Palestinians to rise up against this "insult" is unpleasantly reminiscent of the purported response to Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, eventually known as the Second Intifada.  That an Israeli government expression of the Jewish religious claim to these holy sites should provoke accusations of identity theft by Palestinian Moslems is disappointing, if not surprising.

The Hebron site is holy to Moslems and Jews, since both regard it as the burial place of their common patriarch, Abraham.  For the Jews, however, the cave within also entombs Abraham's wife Sarah, and the next two generations of Jewish patriarchs, Isaac and Jacob, along with their wives, Rebecca and Leah.  Jacob's more beloved wife, Rachel, was buried along the road to Bethlehem after dying in childbirth.  The site of Rachel's Tomb in Ramallah has been marked in its present location since at least the Fifth Century.  As Prime Minister Netanyahu's office noted, both sites have been holy to the Jewish people for over 3,500 years.  Each has been the site of a mosque, even though Rachel's Tomb has no inherent religious significance to Moslems.

And then there is the Temple Mount.  The center of Jewish religious and national aspiration since at least the founding of the First Temple, which was destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 BCE - more than 1200 years before Mohammed.  Even if we only went back to the Second Temple, destroyed by the Romans in 70, this is still many centuries before Mohammed.  Yet possession by the Moslem world was for many centuries thereafter worth a great deal more than history, and the Temple Mount is now home to one of the world's most beautiful buildings, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, and is claimed by Moslems as their number 3 holy site.  Remarkably, although Israel gained control of East Jerusalem from Jordan in the Six Day War in 1967, it has truly ceded control over the Temple Mount to the Palestinian Arabs, and since the mid-1990s, the Palestinian Authority.

Yes, as is so often noted, these places are holy to the three major western religions.  But it is only for the Jews that this land was the center, the home, the promised land, and earned that special status many centuries before Jesus and Mohammed.  Whether one believes the veracity of the biblical claim, or details of the biblical narrative, one can only deny the Jews' foremost attachment to this land through a process of wholesale whitewash.

The rights and access of other religions to their holy sites has never been as strongly protected as they have been by the Israelis.  This was never the case when Jordan controlled the west bank, and the Jews have every reason to be concerned about the protection of their access and freedom of worship in a Palestinian state.  Perhaps more important even than that is the long-continued strategy of delegitimization of Israel's historical and religious attachment to the various places in and around modern-day Israel. 

Netanyahu's action in staking a historical claim to the Tomb of the Patriarchs and Rachel's Tomb comes very late, and at a politically awkward time in view of the efforts underway by George Mitchell to get Israel and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table.  But it is not a moment too soon for Israel to draw the proverbial line in the sand - to make nonnegotiable its historical and religious position in the region.  And by so doing, he might possibly be able to get on the table the principle that each side in this conflict must accept that the other will have political sovereignty over some of its holy places, and respect one another's rights to religious visitation.

Goldstone Agonistes (Eyeless in Gaza)

This past Tuesday I had the opportunity to attend a lecture by Richard Goldstone, head of the infamous UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict and principal author of the resulting report. The lecture was entitled "Accounting for War Crimes: Israel and Hamas," presented by New York Law School's Center for International Law. I believe my title for these observations is pretty apt. Below are a few observations and impressions:


• There was a strong turnout - maybe 130 people. I was pleased to see a strong showing by the pro-Israel community, beginning with a two-page handout from the Jewish Law Students Association at the door.

• The host professor had asked Goldstone not to go into the substance of the report, but to talk more about the context and other matters pertaining to his involvement. Aspects of the report itself came out more in the course of the approximately 40 minutes of Q&A.

• He started with some background about international war crimes prosecutions, beginning with Nuremburg as the first serious attempt to hold individuals accountable for war crimes. Here, as elsewhere, it seemed to me that this otherwise apparently intelligent man was incapable of noticing irony.

• In addition to Nuremburg, he referred to Stalin's show trials in the 1930's. I don't think Goldstone realizes that the masters he serves have a lot more in common with Stalin than with Truman.

• He took some pains to explain that the US had been a leader in the efforts to set up the International Criminal Court, and noted that President Truman had been strongly in favor of the Nuremburg trials. Goldstone is obviously troubled by the fact that the US and several other major countries have not submitted themselves to the court's jurisdiction.

• He mentioned a couple of things that seemed intended as analogies to his current predicament.

o When he first started to investigate war crimes in Bosnia, he met with the head of the Serbian government. The Serb leader was furious, said they'd been unfairly singled out. (I believe Goldstone thought this echoed protests that Israel was being unfairly singled out). Goldstone told him that if they were the first and last to be prosecuted, it would be unfair. But if they were the first of many, then it wouldn't.

o When he investigated human rights abuses in South Africa, whites down there accused him of being a traitor. (I'm guessing he thinks the Jewish community sees him the same way, and he thinks they're no more right about it).

• On the whole, his comments seemed to be fairly defensive, intended to refute some of the worst of what people now think of him and the report. Thus, for example, he explained that when first contacted by the head of the Human Rights Council to lead the investigation, he turned it down because the January 12, 2009 mandate by the Council was "to investigate all violations of international human rights law . . . by the occupying Power, Israel . . . due to the current aggression." He was subsequently summoned to Geneva and pressed to state his conditions for heading the group. After they agreed to starting without foreordained conclusions and to look at both sides, he agreed to take the job. He says he was unaware that others, including Mary Robinson, had previously turned down the job.

• In his own words, he naively thought that a thorough, objective investigation of the facts by his independent commission might be in Israel's interest. This comment exemplifies how obtuse an individual he seems to be, at least regarding Israel's position in world politics. He tried rather desperately to get Israel to cooperate with the investigation, but received virtually no support.

• In the Q&A there was discussion about the strength of the evidence on which the report was based. He acknowledged that their findings were necessarily based on limited information available - in his words, "a small sample"; they did the best they could with what they had available, and in a very limited time frame. He seems to be backing away from some of the stronger wording in the report, which is more akin to a legal indictment if not outright judgment.

• There seems to be no sense of proportion to Goldstone's view of war crimes. He took strong issue with the proposition at least implied in Robert Bernstein's October 20 Op-Ed piece in the NY Times that democracies shouldn't be prosecuted for war crimes violations and only despotic regimes should be. He seems to regard war crimes in a manner akin to traffic violations: it's not a question of whether a person is fundamentally a good or bad driver; if you run a stop sign and get caught, you have to pay the penalty.

• He believes strongly in the law enforcement approach rather than a military approach to fighting terrorism. In his words, "It's a matter of fighting crime." Goldstone's belief in the power and purity of the law rivals that of Inspector Javert.

• His view about identification of civilians and the necessity to avoid their casualties approaches something like strict liability, i.e., if you think you might harm someone beyond the person who's shooting at you, you must not attack. To do so is a war crime.

• When asked about one member of the mission, Christine Chinkin of the London School of Economics, he reacted very defensively. She co-signed a letter to The Times of London last January which, among other things, said that Israel's military action in Gaza was not self-defense. Characteristically, Goldstone focused solely on this issue and defended it on the basis that, under international law, a state is not technically acting in self-defense other than against invasion by another state. He noted that US actions against Al Qaeda are not, strictly speaking, self-defense. Be that as it may, he ignores the larger fact that the Times letter, rather than being a law review article, was a strongly worded opinion piece condemning the entirety of Operation Cast Lead.

• One questioner asked how he felt about the fact that his report was being used by the members of the UN Human Rights Council to cast Israel into a pariah state (in response to which I muttered, "It already was."). Goldstone got angry at this, stating that if Israel was becoming a pariah state it was due solely to its own actions.

• One wonders how he would approach the task if he were doing what he does in 1939, and Hitler asked him to investigate the conduct of the Polish army during the conflict with Germany (the one where Germany invaded Poland) to determine whether any Polish soldiers had committed war crimes against the Germans. It seems that Goldstone would be honored to have the opportunity to bring the few Polish scoundrels to justice, and be comfortable ignoring the motivations of his employer and the broader context of his investigation. That's unfair of me, though: Judge Goldstone would insist on investigating both sides in the conflict.

• Early on, Goldstone, in a rare moment of obvious self-pride, said he often tells his students, "If you don't understand the politics of international justice, then you don't understand international justice." Remarkably, the greatest surprise to me is how grossly he seems to fail to understand the politics of international justice where Israel is concerned, and of the political consequences of his own actions.

• One questioner mentioned that his doctor had contrasted his judgment-rich advice with what the patient apparently wanted by saying "I'm not a muffler shop, where you go in, put your money down and walk out with a muffler." His unfinished question to Goldstone was, "By taking on this job, haven't you in effect become a war crimes muffler shop, willing to hunt around for war crimes regardless of whether it makes sense to do so?" Did he really think he could be serving justice and truth, and even remotely think this might be good for Israel, considering the nature and motivation of those who hired him?

o More than the muffler shop, I'm thinking of the gun for hire. Jack Wilson, played by Jack Palance, in Shane, brought in by the rancher to run Van Heflin and the other homesteaders off the land. The rules of the game, though, as indicated when he shoots down the character played by Elisha Cook, Jr., involve encouraging (goading) the victim into what may appear on paper as a fair fight, but results in little more than an execution.

• Is he Inspector Javert or Jack Wilson?  Clueless zealot or gun for hire?  I gather more the former, but given his apparent willingness to attack whoever he's asked to, and by whomever asks, I'm not sure the victim can see the difference.