My wife and I recently came back from two days of presentations at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's (TWI) annual Soref Symposium. Below is an extremely abbreviated summary of some of what I took away from the program. While many of the presentations were explicitly off the record, I am confident that I am not betraying confidences, inasmuch as (a) I am not attributing views to any particular individuals, and (b) the reporting is highly filtered. Despite some intrusion from my own biases, I think I'm conveying some key points gleaned from scholars and policy makers far more knowledgeable than I. See below for list of speakers.
Israel and the Peace Process
Hamas-Fatah deal wouldn't have happened without Egypt, and challenges in Syria, which has historically been a key Hamas sponsor. Mahmoud Abbas has given up on US, more uncomfortable after seeing our abandonment of Mubarak, who had been a key patron. Abbas sees his legacy more in terms of Palestinian unity and "statehood," without peacemaking. Neither Fatah nor Hamas wants to see things change on the ground, however; little will change in the near term. More hopeful about Salam Fayyad staying on as Prime Minister of PA, despite initial indications to the contrary, and fact that Hamas says no. Fayyad is key to credibility with US, Europeans; Fayyad may now finally be looking to run to succeed Mahmoud Abbas. US law requires President to certify that Quartet conditions met before economic aid or dealing with PA government.
US is the only member of Quartet insisting on post-reconciliation government adhering to Quartet conditions. Netanyahu is in Europe this week, essential that he be able to convince Europeans on this point, as well as on opposing UN GA recognition of Palestinian state.
Regarding the "peace process," little chance that Netanyahu will announce bold initiatives in Washington next week. With much higher risks on Egyptian, Gaza and potentially Jordanian borders, and demonstrable lack of sustainability of Arab regimes, it's not a great time for bold, risky moves. Nevertheless, negotiations could possibly get into gear if Netanyahu and Abbas each take a big step and cross a threshold - for Netanyahu, some statements about borders, and for Abbas, acceptance of legitimacy of a Jewish state. Another alternative may be for Obama to put some ideas out there with tacit acquiescence from Israelis, albeit not binding on them, with disclaimer that ideas not applicable to PA that includes irredentist Hamas.
Egypt
From US and Israel standpoint, near term will not be good, question is how bad. Longer term, more likely better than under Mubarak regime. Egypt will not abrogate treaty with Israel - very much in Egypt's interest. Not doing 180 degree turn, but question of whether more than 90. The best of likely near term outcomes is Islamists holding significant minority of Parliament seats and Amr Moussa president (not good, but worse would be majority Islamist). High expectations among young people can give way to problems if too deeply disappointed.
Hopes of those leading the Tahrir Square uprising are giving way to fears. Fears include military continuing Mubarak approaches; too quick march to elections before liberal institutions can develop; increased power of Salafis (worse than Muslim Brotherhood). Women's rights suffering. Others in Egypt say average Egyptian is focused on stability and fears a theocracy. Muslim Brothers will gain seats in Parliament, but Salafis don't believe in voting, unlikely to seek political power. (Note that recent reports indicate the Brothers may now be seeking majority in Parliament, possibly presidency).
Iran
Will Arab spring sweep eastward into Iran? From standpoint of Iran's principal troublemaking role in region - including Hamas, Hezbollah, nuclear weapons proliferation - regime change is critical. Arab spring has derailed US Iran policy. US Administration has no new ideas, content to kick this can down the road to second term. We need to slow down the nuclear clock and speed up the democracy clock in Iran
Syria
Newspapers have been reporting that Israel is wary of what could happen if Assad were pushed out of office, the devil they know being better than one they don't. Not everyone feels that way: some astute Israelis don't see the unknown being any worse than Assad. Note that Syria is a fairly secular country; the Muslim Brotherhood not a significant presence. In this case, the moral force favoring the uprising is in line with strategic interests.
Turkey
A year or so ago, perspective on next year's elections was that it could be the last election before the country becomes irredeemably Islamist and anti-Western, the key being whether AKP locks in another term for Erdogan. Now the issue is framed as to whether AKP only gets a majority, or gets a 2/3 majority enabling it to amend the Constitution to lock in powers in the manner of Venezuela. Beyond that, there are still some optimists who think that in the medium term Turkey under AKP will find its natural interests being in strong competition with Iran, not aligned with it, even eventually [re]-aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Economic Aid
Egypt and Tunisia desperately need significant amounts of economic aid to get through critical transitional period. On a "micro" level, the people need stability and there is no margin for deterioration of average citizen's economic condition. Jordan as well is in dire need of such help for the monarchy to survive. Help must come from Saudis, not Americans. Saudi Arabia may condition economic assistance to Egypt on no prosecution of Mubarak.
US Strategic Interests
Excellent outline of principal US strategic interest in the Mideast (PS - did not come from National Security Adviser Tom Donilon):
1. Global access to energy and freedom of shipping lanes.
2. Secure and strong Israel
3. Enduring interest in and commitment to defeating and dismantling terrorism.
4. Nonproliferation. Here, greatest threat is tactical nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
The above must be paramount for US. Bahrain is situation where our vital security interests trumped pro-democratic sympathies.
Four strategic pillars in the region are Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. One speaker described the competing powers in the region as ominously similar to Europe in 1911.
Islamic Extremism in the US
Heard from heads of three US Islamic groups working to combat extremist Islamic ideology in US. All agreed that US Islamic establishment was funded and populated by Gulf states in 1970s, strongly infused with Wahabi-Salafist ideology. They dominate mosques and campus Islamic groups in this country. Fighting against violence alone will not be sufficient.
The following is a list of speakers at the Soref Symposium (excluding speakers at breakout sessions I did not attend): Robert Satloff, Exec. Director of TWI; Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli defense intelligence; Soner Cagaptay, director of Turkish Research Program of TWI; Retired IDF Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog; David Makovsky, director of TWI's project on Middle East peace process; Michael Singh, Managing Director of TWI; Scott Carpenter, director of TWI's Project Fikra; Zainab al-Suwaij, executive director, American Islamic Congress; Zuhdi Jasser, chairman, American Islamic Forum for Democracy; Hedieh Mirahmadi, president, World Organization for Resource Development & Education; Matthew Levitt, director of TWI's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; Patrick Clawson, director of TWI's Iran Security Initiative; Mehdi Klalaji, TWI Iranian scholar; Thomas Donilon, assistant to the President for national security affairs; Amr al-Azm, associate professor, Shawnee State University; Dalia Ziada, director, North Africa bureau, American Islamic Congress; Hisham Kassem, independent Egyptian publisher and journalist; Amb. James Larocco, director of Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies; Martin Kramer, TWI Wexler-Fromer fellow; Robert Kagan, Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution; Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson Center.
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