Chuck Schumer announced earlier this summer that he would vote against the JCPOA deal that President Obama struck with Iran and the other members of the P5+1. We now know for sure with hindsight what many long-time Schumer critics had suspected at the time - that this was less an act of political courage and conviction than of cool political calculation. Schumer at the time made clear that he would not seek to influence the votes of his fellow Democrats, including that of his junior NY Senator and political protégé Kirsten Gillibrand (who proclaimed her support of the deal nearly simultaneously with Schumer's announcement). President Obama has now passed the finish line in his effort to persuade at least 34 Senate Democrats to support the Agreement and thereby ensure his ability to sustain a Presidential veto.
As I look at Senator Schumer, I am struck by two analogies. One is the soldier who is able to get a ticket back home from the front by deliberately sustaining a flesh wound, just severe enough to gain a medical pass.
The analogy I like better is one we have all seen in the movies, and it connects more directly with the Senator's oft-cited self-appointed role, based on a play on his name in Hebrew, that he is the shomer, or guardian, of Israel (and I will add, the US). So think of the soldier/security guard charged with standing as sentry protecting his king or queen. The invaders arrive in force and heavily armed, and either out of mercy or collusion, provide him with the excuse of a credible black eye, as he stands aside to facilitate their mission's success. Maybe he even sounds the general alarm just as the marauders are safely out of the castle with the king.
The August 6 NY Times headline read "Chuck Schumer Opposes Iran Nuclear Deal . . . ". But did he? Specifically, did he oppose the deal, or merely announce that he would be one vote out of 100 against the deal when the time came? My dictionaries define "oppose" in fairly strong, active terms. Here are a few: (1) to act against or provide resistance to; combat; (2) to stand in the way of; hinder, obstruct; (3) to set as an opponent or adversary. Did he do any of these things? Certainly not. Pretty clearly, he did not use his political power as presumptive Democratic leader, nor does he even appear to have used his powers of persuasion to win over colleagues.
We will never know whether Senator Schumer might have, if he tried, been able to win over enough Senators to deny President Obama a victory on the Iran deal. The guard at the castle gate might have been able to thwart the invaders' entry by sounding the alarm sooner, gathering comrades, engaging them at greater personal risk to himself. Debatable whether the guard's action sinks to the level of punishable cowardice, but let us at least remember not to award him any medals.
Friday, September 4, 2015
Tuesday, December 9, 2014
Does Torture Work? Does it Matter?
Senator Feinstein said on PBS Newshour that the "big finding of the report is that torture does not work." More generally, one hears the following: The CIA enhanced interrogation techniques were terrible, immoral, grossly inconsistent with our values and can not be permitted in a civilized society. And what's more, they don't work.
Huh? The notation that torture (we'll call it that for simplicity sake) doesn't work undermines the main point, doesn't it? It implies that if torture did work, then well, maybe, that morality and civilization stuff could be brushed aside. OR, it's sort of a parting shot at the CIA goons, as if to say they're the gang that couldn't shoot straight, who probably just enjoy doing harmful things to people.
We should presume that, at the very least, our intelligence officials possess cumulatively a resaonable amount of expertise, and act in the good faith belief that approaches they take will yield useful information. And to be intellectually, politically and morally honest, the authors of the Report and those who defend it should be conceding, at least for purposes of discussion, that sometimes torture does help accelerate the process of getting useful, important and potentially life-saving information from hardened and despicable terrorists, but declare that despite this, we should never allow it.
Huh? The notation that torture (we'll call it that for simplicity sake) doesn't work undermines the main point, doesn't it? It implies that if torture did work, then well, maybe, that morality and civilization stuff could be brushed aside. OR, it's sort of a parting shot at the CIA goons, as if to say they're the gang that couldn't shoot straight, who probably just enjoy doing harmful things to people.
We should presume that, at the very least, our intelligence officials possess cumulatively a resaonable amount of expertise, and act in the good faith belief that approaches they take will yield useful information. And to be intellectually, politically and morally honest, the authors of the Report and those who defend it should be conceding, at least for purposes of discussion, that sometimes torture does help accelerate the process of getting useful, important and potentially life-saving information from hardened and despicable terrorists, but declare that despite this, we should never allow it.
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Pollard Is Now a Hostage
The April 2 NY Times lead story reports the breakdown of attempts to extend negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. One sentence in the article should make the stomach of every American turn. The article reports that President Obama authorized John Kerry to discuss the possible early release of convicted spy Jonathan Pollard. Then comes the following apparently innocuous sentence: “Whether, and how, to use Mr. Pollard has been vigorously debated within the administration.”
Our government is debating how best to “use” the possible release of a prisoner, not a POW and not a quasi-POW enemy spy captured in the Spy vs Spy world of the Cold War. Pollard is an American citizen convicted of espionage on behalf of a friendly country and sentenced to life imprisonment after pleading guilty under a plea bargain gone bad. Many prominent Americans and more recently, Israelis, have pleaded unsuccessfully for leniency. Regardless of what you may think about the merits of that question, it is abhorrent to see indications that our government regards the decision to hold or release him as a means to the end of inducing our friends in Israel to do what we want them to do.
And what do we want them to do? According to The Times, “some officials argue that [Pollard] should be used only to break the logjam on final-status issues – the borders of a new Palestinian state, for example . . . . Mr. Kerry has argued that Mr. Pollard could be more useful now in keeping the talks alive, given the possibility of parole [in 2015] . . . .” Apparently our Secretary of State understands that Pollard’s value will diminish as a parole hearing approaches.
Regardless of whether you thought Pollard should be released, most of us were under the impression that in either case the view was based on principles of policy and justice. Now it appears that our government had an additional reason to hold onto Pollard that was based not on policy but on utility. What can we trade him for? This is the sort of thing that thug regimes do, and certainly criminal enterprises do, but not something our government does. As Ruth Marcus wrote in The Washington Post on April 1, “there is something disconcerting – repulsive is only slightly too strong a word – about having justice used as a diplomatic bargaining chip.”
And what are the competing “uses” being debated for Jonathan Pollard’s freedom? John Kerry wanted to offer him to the Israelis so that they would release more cold-blooded murderers, itself the price demanded by Mahmoud Abbas to sit with folded arms for another nine months. And if the Israelis went along with this, as they were reportedly inclined to do, it would be a dirty business for them and the Americans, but there would (other than the absence of a concession from Abbas himself) be at least some perverse symmetry in the deal.
What is more bewildering, however, is that some of our unnamed officials were counseling the President to hold onto Pollard and throw him into a final status deal. Indeed, it seems to be the dominant view among critics of this deal – including Senator Dianne Feinstein – that Pollard should be saved to be hauled out to get the really big concessions we want from the Israelis down the road. Which issue do these officials think the Israelis would concede in exchange for Pollard’s freedom: Security in the Jordan valley? Palestinians’ right of return? End of hostilities? Jerusalem?
We have seen in the Gilad Shalit deal that the Israelis will free hundreds of terrorist murderers from prison to win back one Jew from captivity. We have seen them agree nine months ago to free scores more to win the possibility of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. Somehow, time and again, the world views Israel as greedily and stubbornly holding all the high cards, and believes that what’s needed is the right pressures, the right inducements, to persuade Israel to give them up. Keeping Pollard as a trump card for the US is, in this respect, incompetent and amazingly ignorant of Israeli motivations in its negotiations with the Palestinians. Unfortunately, we’ve become used to such incompetence. What is new, and more saddening, about this latest action is that it shames America as well.
Saturday, August 31, 2013
A few simple questions about Obama Administration foreign policy "process"
Just a few simple questions come to mind as we watch our President flounder in his effort to figure out how to respond to Assad’s recent use of chemical weapons to massacre his fellow Syrian countrymen (and women and children):
• Why is the Obama Administration only now scrambling to rally international support for a military response?
• Why is the Administration only now scrambling to rally Congressional support for a military response?
• Why is the Administration only now scrambling to develop a legal rationale for a military response?
• Before declaring that Assad must go, and later on, that the use or movement of chemical or biological weapons would be a “game changer,” did President Obama follow his much-admired consultative and deliberative method of decision making, and thus, have in mind what sorts of actions the US might take if this red line were crossed?
The present circumstances – Assad’s use of chemical weapons – were not inevitable, but surely, reasonably anticipated. Ideological issues aside, the incompetence of the President in foreign policy, as exemplified by the current predicament, should jump to the top of anyone’s list of reasons why he his presidency has diminished our nation.
PS – Difficult to know, but is it possible that the British Parliament might have voted differently if Obama had invested more in his relationship with the UK? Indeed, is it possible that a few MP’s had in mind the return of the Winston Churchill bust when they cast their vote not to support President Obama in Syria?
PPS (more important) – As others have pointed out, what is Iran to conclude about the possibility of US military action to remove its nuclear weapons capability? Isn’t it abundantly clear now that, even if at some point Obama reluctantly concluded that the time had come to take such action, he would find himself even more hamstrung than he is today?
Monday, February 20, 2012
How the US Can Avoid an Israeli Strike on Iran
There has been a lot of jawboning by US military and Administration officials, both in public and, presumably, in private talks with Israeli leaders, to dissuade them from launching a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. In fact, there is probably only one approach that the US can take to avoid an Israeli attack, and that is to credibly assure the Israelis that the Americans will do the job before it's too late.
There have been several good articles, including one in today's NY Times, outlining the enormous challenges to Israel in accomplishing a reasonably successful raid, and many more articles have emphasized the variously described unpleasant consequences of even successful Israeli military action. True enough, but unless someone has been able to convince the Israelis that they can live with a nuclear armed Iran, then these are the essential pieces of the equation:
1. Israel and the US agree that Iran is aggressively pursuing the development of nuclear weaponry.
2. Israel believes that some time well before the end of this year Iran will have entered what Defense Minster Barak refers to as the "zone of immunity," where it will have dispersed, hidden and buried its nuclear facilites to the point where Israel will no longer be able (even if all goes well) to set the program back significantly.
3. The US faces a similar zone of immunity problem, but due to its greatly superior capabilities, that moment will come months later than for Israel.
4. Sanctions against Iran are finally inflicting pain, but few analysts expect that they will result in either a change in Ayatollah Khamanei's determination to become a nuclear power, or an overthrow of the current regime, during the current year (or more particularly, before Iran enters the zone of immunity).
5. Finally, for Israel the prospect of the current Iranian regime possessing nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable, which for Israel means that it will do whatever is in its power to prevent it, including a military strike.
So what is Israel to do? And what arguments are available to its close and powerful friend, the United States, to prevent or at least delay such action? Unless Ayatollah Khamanei does actually (pardon the exprssion) see the light and strike a credible deal very soon, then the only truly relevant message the US can deliver is this: "We are equally committed to preventing Iran from reaching its nuclear objective; we do have the luxury of waiting longer for sanctions to work; but we will use the military option before the window closes on our zone of immunity with Iran."
How can such an assurance be conveyed? Presumably, nothing short of a direct, categorical statement from President Obama to Prime Minister Netanyahu when they meet in Washington in early March.
There have been several good articles, including one in today's NY Times, outlining the enormous challenges to Israel in accomplishing a reasonably successful raid, and many more articles have emphasized the variously described unpleasant consequences of even successful Israeli military action. True enough, but unless someone has been able to convince the Israelis that they can live with a nuclear armed Iran, then these are the essential pieces of the equation:
1. Israel and the US agree that Iran is aggressively pursuing the development of nuclear weaponry.
2. Israel believes that some time well before the end of this year Iran will have entered what Defense Minster Barak refers to as the "zone of immunity," where it will have dispersed, hidden and buried its nuclear facilites to the point where Israel will no longer be able (even if all goes well) to set the program back significantly.
3. The US faces a similar zone of immunity problem, but due to its greatly superior capabilities, that moment will come months later than for Israel.
4. Sanctions against Iran are finally inflicting pain, but few analysts expect that they will result in either a change in Ayatollah Khamanei's determination to become a nuclear power, or an overthrow of the current regime, during the current year (or more particularly, before Iran enters the zone of immunity).
5. Finally, for Israel the prospect of the current Iranian regime possessing nuclear weapons capability is unacceptable, which for Israel means that it will do whatever is in its power to prevent it, including a military strike.
So what is Israel to do? And what arguments are available to its close and powerful friend, the United States, to prevent or at least delay such action? Unless Ayatollah Khamanei does actually (pardon the exprssion) see the light and strike a credible deal very soon, then the only truly relevant message the US can deliver is this: "We are equally committed to preventing Iran from reaching its nuclear objective; we do have the luxury of waiting longer for sanctions to work; but we will use the military option before the window closes on our zone of immunity with Iran."
How can such an assurance be conveyed? Presumably, nothing short of a direct, categorical statement from President Obama to Prime Minister Netanyahu when they meet in Washington in early March.
Thursday, May 19, 2011
Some Takeaways from The Washington Institute's Soref Symposium
My wife and I recently came back from two days of presentations at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy's (TWI) annual Soref Symposium. Below is an extremely abbreviated summary of some of what I took away from the program. While many of the presentations were explicitly off the record, I am confident that I am not betraying confidences, inasmuch as (a) I am not attributing views to any particular individuals, and (b) the reporting is highly filtered. Despite some intrusion from my own biases, I think I'm conveying some key points gleaned from scholars and policy makers far more knowledgeable than I. See below for list of speakers.
Israel and the Peace Process
Hamas-Fatah deal wouldn't have happened without Egypt, and challenges in Syria, which has historically been a key Hamas sponsor. Mahmoud Abbas has given up on US, more uncomfortable after seeing our abandonment of Mubarak, who had been a key patron. Abbas sees his legacy more in terms of Palestinian unity and "statehood," without peacemaking. Neither Fatah nor Hamas wants to see things change on the ground, however; little will change in the near term. More hopeful about Salam Fayyad staying on as Prime Minister of PA, despite initial indications to the contrary, and fact that Hamas says no. Fayyad is key to credibility with US, Europeans; Fayyad may now finally be looking to run to succeed Mahmoud Abbas. US law requires President to certify that Quartet conditions met before economic aid or dealing with PA government.
US is the only member of Quartet insisting on post-reconciliation government adhering to Quartet conditions. Netanyahu is in Europe this week, essential that he be able to convince Europeans on this point, as well as on opposing UN GA recognition of Palestinian state.
Regarding the "peace process," little chance that Netanyahu will announce bold initiatives in Washington next week. With much higher risks on Egyptian, Gaza and potentially Jordanian borders, and demonstrable lack of sustainability of Arab regimes, it's not a great time for bold, risky moves. Nevertheless, negotiations could possibly get into gear if Netanyahu and Abbas each take a big step and cross a threshold - for Netanyahu, some statements about borders, and for Abbas, acceptance of legitimacy of a Jewish state. Another alternative may be for Obama to put some ideas out there with tacit acquiescence from Israelis, albeit not binding on them, with disclaimer that ideas not applicable to PA that includes irredentist Hamas.
Egypt
From US and Israel standpoint, near term will not be good, question is how bad. Longer term, more likely better than under Mubarak regime. Egypt will not abrogate treaty with Israel - very much in Egypt's interest. Not doing 180 degree turn, but question of whether more than 90. The best of likely near term outcomes is Islamists holding significant minority of Parliament seats and Amr Moussa president (not good, but worse would be majority Islamist). High expectations among young people can give way to problems if too deeply disappointed.
Hopes of those leading the Tahrir Square uprising are giving way to fears. Fears include military continuing Mubarak approaches; too quick march to elections before liberal institutions can develop; increased power of Salafis (worse than Muslim Brotherhood). Women's rights suffering. Others in Egypt say average Egyptian is focused on stability and fears a theocracy. Muslim Brothers will gain seats in Parliament, but Salafis don't believe in voting, unlikely to seek political power. (Note that recent reports indicate the Brothers may now be seeking majority in Parliament, possibly presidency).
Iran
Will Arab spring sweep eastward into Iran? From standpoint of Iran's principal troublemaking role in region - including Hamas, Hezbollah, nuclear weapons proliferation - regime change is critical. Arab spring has derailed US Iran policy. US Administration has no new ideas, content to kick this can down the road to second term. We need to slow down the nuclear clock and speed up the democracy clock in Iran
Syria
Newspapers have been reporting that Israel is wary of what could happen if Assad were pushed out of office, the devil they know being better than one they don't. Not everyone feels that way: some astute Israelis don't see the unknown being any worse than Assad. Note that Syria is a fairly secular country; the Muslim Brotherhood not a significant presence. In this case, the moral force favoring the uprising is in line with strategic interests.
Turkey
A year or so ago, perspective on next year's elections was that it could be the last election before the country becomes irredeemably Islamist and anti-Western, the key being whether AKP locks in another term for Erdogan. Now the issue is framed as to whether AKP only gets a majority, or gets a 2/3 majority enabling it to amend the Constitution to lock in powers in the manner of Venezuela. Beyond that, there are still some optimists who think that in the medium term Turkey under AKP will find its natural interests being in strong competition with Iran, not aligned with it, even eventually [re]-aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Economic Aid
Egypt and Tunisia desperately need significant amounts of economic aid to get through critical transitional period. On a "micro" level, the people need stability and there is no margin for deterioration of average citizen's economic condition. Jordan as well is in dire need of such help for the monarchy to survive. Help must come from Saudis, not Americans. Saudi Arabia may condition economic assistance to Egypt on no prosecution of Mubarak.
US Strategic Interests
Excellent outline of principal US strategic interest in the Mideast (PS - did not come from National Security Adviser Tom Donilon):
1. Global access to energy and freedom of shipping lanes.
2. Secure and strong Israel
3. Enduring interest in and commitment to defeating and dismantling terrorism.
4. Nonproliferation. Here, greatest threat is tactical nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
The above must be paramount for US. Bahrain is situation where our vital security interests trumped pro-democratic sympathies.
Four strategic pillars in the region are Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. One speaker described the competing powers in the region as ominously similar to Europe in 1911.
Islamic Extremism in the US
Heard from heads of three US Islamic groups working to combat extremist Islamic ideology in US. All agreed that US Islamic establishment was funded and populated by Gulf states in 1970s, strongly infused with Wahabi-Salafist ideology. They dominate mosques and campus Islamic groups in this country. Fighting against violence alone will not be sufficient.
The following is a list of speakers at the Soref Symposium (excluding speakers at breakout sessions I did not attend): Robert Satloff, Exec. Director of TWI; Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli defense intelligence; Soner Cagaptay, director of Turkish Research Program of TWI; Retired IDF Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog; David Makovsky, director of TWI's project on Middle East peace process; Michael Singh, Managing Director of TWI; Scott Carpenter, director of TWI's Project Fikra; Zainab al-Suwaij, executive director, American Islamic Congress; Zuhdi Jasser, chairman, American Islamic Forum for Democracy; Hedieh Mirahmadi, president, World Organization for Resource Development & Education; Matthew Levitt, director of TWI's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; Patrick Clawson, director of TWI's Iran Security Initiative; Mehdi Klalaji, TWI Iranian scholar; Thomas Donilon, assistant to the President for national security affairs; Amr al-Azm, associate professor, Shawnee State University; Dalia Ziada, director, North Africa bureau, American Islamic Congress; Hisham Kassem, independent Egyptian publisher and journalist; Amb. James Larocco, director of Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies; Martin Kramer, TWI Wexler-Fromer fellow; Robert Kagan, Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution; Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson Center.
Israel and the Peace Process
Hamas-Fatah deal wouldn't have happened without Egypt, and challenges in Syria, which has historically been a key Hamas sponsor. Mahmoud Abbas has given up on US, more uncomfortable after seeing our abandonment of Mubarak, who had been a key patron. Abbas sees his legacy more in terms of Palestinian unity and "statehood," without peacemaking. Neither Fatah nor Hamas wants to see things change on the ground, however; little will change in the near term. More hopeful about Salam Fayyad staying on as Prime Minister of PA, despite initial indications to the contrary, and fact that Hamas says no. Fayyad is key to credibility with US, Europeans; Fayyad may now finally be looking to run to succeed Mahmoud Abbas. US law requires President to certify that Quartet conditions met before economic aid or dealing with PA government.
US is the only member of Quartet insisting on post-reconciliation government adhering to Quartet conditions. Netanyahu is in Europe this week, essential that he be able to convince Europeans on this point, as well as on opposing UN GA recognition of Palestinian state.
Regarding the "peace process," little chance that Netanyahu will announce bold initiatives in Washington next week. With much higher risks on Egyptian, Gaza and potentially Jordanian borders, and demonstrable lack of sustainability of Arab regimes, it's not a great time for bold, risky moves. Nevertheless, negotiations could possibly get into gear if Netanyahu and Abbas each take a big step and cross a threshold - for Netanyahu, some statements about borders, and for Abbas, acceptance of legitimacy of a Jewish state. Another alternative may be for Obama to put some ideas out there with tacit acquiescence from Israelis, albeit not binding on them, with disclaimer that ideas not applicable to PA that includes irredentist Hamas.
Egypt
From US and Israel standpoint, near term will not be good, question is how bad. Longer term, more likely better than under Mubarak regime. Egypt will not abrogate treaty with Israel - very much in Egypt's interest. Not doing 180 degree turn, but question of whether more than 90. The best of likely near term outcomes is Islamists holding significant minority of Parliament seats and Amr Moussa president (not good, but worse would be majority Islamist). High expectations among young people can give way to problems if too deeply disappointed.
Hopes of those leading the Tahrir Square uprising are giving way to fears. Fears include military continuing Mubarak approaches; too quick march to elections before liberal institutions can develop; increased power of Salafis (worse than Muslim Brotherhood). Women's rights suffering. Others in Egypt say average Egyptian is focused on stability and fears a theocracy. Muslim Brothers will gain seats in Parliament, but Salafis don't believe in voting, unlikely to seek political power. (Note that recent reports indicate the Brothers may now be seeking majority in Parliament, possibly presidency).
Iran
Will Arab spring sweep eastward into Iran? From standpoint of Iran's principal troublemaking role in region - including Hamas, Hezbollah, nuclear weapons proliferation - regime change is critical. Arab spring has derailed US Iran policy. US Administration has no new ideas, content to kick this can down the road to second term. We need to slow down the nuclear clock and speed up the democracy clock in Iran
Syria
Newspapers have been reporting that Israel is wary of what could happen if Assad were pushed out of office, the devil they know being better than one they don't. Not everyone feels that way: some astute Israelis don't see the unknown being any worse than Assad. Note that Syria is a fairly secular country; the Muslim Brotherhood not a significant presence. In this case, the moral force favoring the uprising is in line with strategic interests.
Turkey
A year or so ago, perspective on next year's elections was that it could be the last election before the country becomes irredeemably Islamist and anti-Western, the key being whether AKP locks in another term for Erdogan. Now the issue is framed as to whether AKP only gets a majority, or gets a 2/3 majority enabling it to amend the Constitution to lock in powers in the manner of Venezuela. Beyond that, there are still some optimists who think that in the medium term Turkey under AKP will find its natural interests being in strong competition with Iran, not aligned with it, even eventually [re]-aligned with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Economic Aid
Egypt and Tunisia desperately need significant amounts of economic aid to get through critical transitional period. On a "micro" level, the people need stability and there is no margin for deterioration of average citizen's economic condition. Jordan as well is in dire need of such help for the monarchy to survive. Help must come from Saudis, not Americans. Saudi Arabia may condition economic assistance to Egypt on no prosecution of Mubarak.
US Strategic Interests
Excellent outline of principal US strategic interest in the Mideast (PS - did not come from National Security Adviser Tom Donilon):
1. Global access to energy and freedom of shipping lanes.
2. Secure and strong Israel
3. Enduring interest in and commitment to defeating and dismantling terrorism.
4. Nonproliferation. Here, greatest threat is tactical nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.
The above must be paramount for US. Bahrain is situation where our vital security interests trumped pro-democratic sympathies.
Four strategic pillars in the region are Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. One speaker described the competing powers in the region as ominously similar to Europe in 1911.
Islamic Extremism in the US
Heard from heads of three US Islamic groups working to combat extremist Islamic ideology in US. All agreed that US Islamic establishment was funded and populated by Gulf states in 1970s, strongly infused with Wahabi-Salafist ideology. They dominate mosques and campus Islamic groups in this country. Fighting against violence alone will not be sufficient.
The following is a list of speakers at the Soref Symposium (excluding speakers at breakout sessions I did not attend): Robert Satloff, Exec. Director of TWI; Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, former head of Israeli defense intelligence; Soner Cagaptay, director of Turkish Research Program of TWI; Retired IDF Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog; David Makovsky, director of TWI's project on Middle East peace process; Michael Singh, Managing Director of TWI; Scott Carpenter, director of TWI's Project Fikra; Zainab al-Suwaij, executive director, American Islamic Congress; Zuhdi Jasser, chairman, American Islamic Forum for Democracy; Hedieh Mirahmadi, president, World Organization for Resource Development & Education; Matthew Levitt, director of TWI's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence; Patrick Clawson, director of TWI's Iran Security Initiative; Mehdi Klalaji, TWI Iranian scholar; Thomas Donilon, assistant to the President for national security affairs; Amr al-Azm, associate professor, Shawnee State University; Dalia Ziada, director, North Africa bureau, American Islamic Congress; Hisham Kassem, independent Egyptian publisher and journalist; Amb. James Larocco, director of Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies; Martin Kramer, TWI Wexler-Fromer fellow; Robert Kagan, Center on the US and Europe, Brookings Institution; Robin Wright, Woodrow Wilson Center.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
NY Times Blames the Victims in Reporting of Hamas Murder
A news story in today's NY Times carries the straightforward headline "Killing of 4 Israeli Settlers on Eve of Peace Talks Rattles Leaders on Both Sides." The first paragraph of the story by Isabel Kershner and Mark Landler reads as follows:
"The killing of four Israeli settlers, including a pregnanat woman, in the West Bank on Tuesday evening rattled Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the eve of peace talks in Washington and underscored the disruptive role that ___ could play in the already fragile negotiations."
Now fill in the blank, bearing in mind that the next paragraph reveals that "[t]he military wing of Hamas, the Islamic group, claimed responsibility for the attack . . . ." You might have thought that the writers would be referring to the disruptive role that Hamas intends to play in the negotiations. But that, apparently, is too simple-minded. In fact, the reporters - or rather, editorialists - find that this murder "underscored the disruptive role that the issue of Jewish settlements could play" in the negotiations. Thanks for setting us straight on that. Good thing we have Ms. Kershner and Mr. Landler to clarify that the massacre of four people and an unborn child in a car indicates the disruptive role that the victims, rather than their murderers, could play in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
By the way, are these reporters on the ground so clueless as to think that Hamas is driven to clear-conscience killing of Israelis by "the settlements"?
Parenthetically, I note a somewhat disappointing condemnation of this killing by Salam Fayyad, the PA prime minister who represents the best hope of both Palestinians and Israelis for a viable Palestinian state. He said, "We condemn this operation, which contradicts Palestinian interests and the efforts of the Palestinian leadership to garner international support for the national rights of our people." What struck me most was his use of the word "operation," and the absence of any but a tactical criticism of the actions of Hamas. I do not know Mr. Fayyad, but I'll guess that this statement reflects the realities of Palestinian politics, where a moral condemnation of the murder of Israelis is unacceptable, and the necessary posture is that all agree on the ends and only disagree about the means.
But back to Ms. Kershner and Mr. Landler. I'm not someone who rants about the NY Times and its anti-Israel bias. I'd say its point of view is more of a reflection than a leader of shallow group-think on a number of issues, and this putative news story is perhaps a reminder that reporters ought to stick to reporting facts and leave the interpreting to the Op-Ed page. Funny, the people that come up with the headlines for articles are sometimes blamed for their choice of pithy phrases that may belie the contents of the article. In this case, I think the headline people displayed more straight sense than the reporters.
The article that purportedly reports Hamas's killing of four Israelis in a car begins with the bizarre sentence discussed above, and ends with the following:
"The stop-and-go Israeli-Palestinian peace process has often taken place in the shadow of bloody attacks. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel prime minister who led the Oslo peace process in the early and mid-1990s, said his philosophy was "to fight terror as if there were no negotiations and conduct the negotiations as if there was no terror." Mr. Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli right-wing extremist in 1995."
So in case you got distracted by some of the facts of the case - i.e., Hamas murdered four Israelis - and forgot the point made in the first paragraph, and especially if you thought you had figured out who the bad guys were, the smug reporters remind us that it's right-wing Israeli nuts who are the root of the problem.
"The killing of four Israeli settlers, including a pregnanat woman, in the West Bank on Tuesday evening rattled Israeli and Palestinian leaders on the eve of peace talks in Washington and underscored the disruptive role that ___ could play in the already fragile negotiations."
Now fill in the blank, bearing in mind that the next paragraph reveals that "[t]he military wing of Hamas, the Islamic group, claimed responsibility for the attack . . . ." You might have thought that the writers would be referring to the disruptive role that Hamas intends to play in the negotiations. But that, apparently, is too simple-minded. In fact, the reporters - or rather, editorialists - find that this murder "underscored the disruptive role that the issue of Jewish settlements could play" in the negotiations. Thanks for setting us straight on that. Good thing we have Ms. Kershner and Mr. Landler to clarify that the massacre of four people and an unborn child in a car indicates the disruptive role that the victims, rather than their murderers, could play in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
By the way, are these reporters on the ground so clueless as to think that Hamas is driven to clear-conscience killing of Israelis by "the settlements"?
Parenthetically, I note a somewhat disappointing condemnation of this killing by Salam Fayyad, the PA prime minister who represents the best hope of both Palestinians and Israelis for a viable Palestinian state. He said, "We condemn this operation, which contradicts Palestinian interests and the efforts of the Palestinian leadership to garner international support for the national rights of our people." What struck me most was his use of the word "operation," and the absence of any but a tactical criticism of the actions of Hamas. I do not know Mr. Fayyad, but I'll guess that this statement reflects the realities of Palestinian politics, where a moral condemnation of the murder of Israelis is unacceptable, and the necessary posture is that all agree on the ends and only disagree about the means.
But back to Ms. Kershner and Mr. Landler. I'm not someone who rants about the NY Times and its anti-Israel bias. I'd say its point of view is more of a reflection than a leader of shallow group-think on a number of issues, and this putative news story is perhaps a reminder that reporters ought to stick to reporting facts and leave the interpreting to the Op-Ed page. Funny, the people that come up with the headlines for articles are sometimes blamed for their choice of pithy phrases that may belie the contents of the article. In this case, I think the headline people displayed more straight sense than the reporters.
The article that purportedly reports Hamas's killing of four Israelis in a car begins with the bizarre sentence discussed above, and ends with the following:
"The stop-and-go Israeli-Palestinian peace process has often taken place in the shadow of bloody attacks. Yitzhak Rabin, the Israel prime minister who led the Oslo peace process in the early and mid-1990s, said his philosophy was "to fight terror as if there were no negotiations and conduct the negotiations as if there was no terror." Mr. Rabin was assassinated by an Israeli right-wing extremist in 1995."
So in case you got distracted by some of the facts of the case - i.e., Hamas murdered four Israelis - and forgot the point made in the first paragraph, and especially if you thought you had figured out who the bad guys were, the smug reporters remind us that it's right-wing Israeli nuts who are the root of the problem.
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